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introduction
Nowadays privacy is a key issue and has received 
increasing attention from consumers, companies, 
researchers and legislators. Legislative acts, such 
as the European Union Directive1 for personal 
data, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act2 for healthcare and the Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act3 for financial institutions, require 
governments and enterprises to protect the privacy 
of their citizens and customers, respectively. Al-
though enterprises have adopted various strategies 
to protect customers privacy and to make public 
their privacy policies (e.g., publishing a privacy 
policy on web-sites possibly based on P3P4), none 
of these approaches include systematic mecha-
nisms to describe how personal data are actually 
handled after they are collected.
This chapter proposes a conceptual model that 
provides a sound foundation for the definition of 
ABstrAct
Enterprises have adopted various strategies to protect customers’ privacy and to make public their 
policies. This chapter presents a conceptual model for supporting the definition of privacy policies. 
The model, described by means of UML, introduces a set of concepts concerning privacy and defines 
the existent relationships among those concepts along with the interfaces for the definition of privacy 
related mechanisms. The chapter also illustrates how the conceptual model can be used to build de-
sign solutions for three recurrent requirements for privacy aware systems concerning the definition of 
anonymity, the acquisition of the informed consent, and privacy policies enforcement. The proposed 
problems are separately illustrated and a solution based on the conceptual model is described for each 
of them. Finally, in order to assess the model and the design solutions, this chapter presents an example 
concerning the health domain.
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privacy policies. The model, which extends the 
work proposed by Coen-Porisini & al. (2007), 
is defined using UML5 and represents a general 
schema that can be easily adopted in different 
contexts.
A privacy policy defines the way in which data 
referring to individuals can be collected, processed 
and diffused according to the rights that individu-
als are entitled to. Thus, the model introduces the 
concepts, such as users, data, actions, that are 
needed in order to define a privacy policy along 
with the existing relationships among them.
Although the model introduces all the elements 
that are required for the definition of privacy aware 
systems, it operates at a conceptual level with a 
very high level of abstraction. The main benefit 
of this approach is represented by the fact that the 
model is domain independent and it can be used 
in different contexts. In this way analysts and 
designers can describe privacy related features/
requirements and then they can integrate them at 
design time in new or existing systems exploiting 
the visibility and usability of UML.
In addition to presenting the above mentioned 
model, this chapter introduces a design solution to 
some privacy related requirements that are com-
mon to most privacy aware systems. The way in 
which such design solutions are provided is by 
means of design patterns (Gamma et al. 1994), 
which constitute a set of design guidelines and 
schemes that can drive the designer towards the 
specification of a privacy aware system.
In this chapter, for space reasons, we focus 
on the following three requirements: anonymity, 
informed consent acquisition and privacy policy 
enforcement. Notice that other privacy related 
requirements such as pseudonymity, unobserv-
ability and so on can be addressed in the same 
way by developing appropriate design patterns.
Anonymity is an important requirement for a 
privacy aware system that aims at protecting the 
identity of the individuals whose data are handled 
by the system. In general, data can be categorized 
into different classes. Among them, one class 
includes data, referred to as sensitive data, con-
cerning the private life, political or religious creed 
and so on, while another class contains data that 
describes the identity of individuals (e.g., first 
name, family name, etc.). A privacy aware system 
must assure that only authorized users can view 
the existing relationship between sensitive data 
and the identity of the individuals.
Informed consent is another important re-
quirement for privacy aware systems that aims 
at assuring individuals that the system will use 
their data according to their will. For instance 
many legislations require that individuals must 
be informed of both the reasons for which the 
system will handle their data and the way in which 
data processing is performed. In such cases every 
individual has to provide an explicit consent before 
any data processing can occur.
Privacy policies enforcement requires that the 
activities performed within a system are checked 
against the privacy policy in order to avoid any 
privacy violation.
Finally, in order to test the effectiveness of 
the conceptual model and of the proposed design 
solutions, we discuss their application by means 
of an example concerning the healthcare domain.
In the last few years, hospitals, clinics, surger-
ies, and diagnostic centers have increasingly ad-
opted Information Technology-supported health-
care solutions in order to manage health-related 
information and to provide a (semi)automated 
administration of clinical functions. As a conse-
quence, due to its critical nature, the healthcare 
domain represents an ideal field for experimenting 
the definition of privacy mechanisms.
The rest of the chapter is organized in the fol-
lowing way: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the main related works concerning privacy; Sec-
tion 3 introduces the privacy model and discusses 
its main features; Section 4 illustrates how the 
proposed model can be used for defining design 
solutions that achieve specific requirements such 
as the anonymity, the informed consent and the 
enforcement of privacy policies; Section 5 presents 
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an application scenario in the healthcare domain; 
finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
BAckground
While research on security is a well-established 
field, the issues that arise when dealing with pri-
vacy have been under thorough investigation only 
in the recent years. The research efforts aiming at 
the protection of individuals privacy can be parti-
tioned in two main categories: Security-oriented 
Requirement Engineering (SRE) methodologies 
and Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs).
The former focuses on methods for taking 
into account security and privacy issues during 
the early stages of systems development, while 
the latter describes techniques to ensure privacy.
Several existing requirement engineering 
methodologies, such as Kaos (Lamsweerde & al. 
2000), Tropos (Liu & al., 2002), Secure Tropos 
(Mouratidis & al., 2003a; Mouratidis & al., 2003b; 
Mouratidis & Giorgini, 2007), NFR (Chung, 1993; 
Mylopolulos & al., 1992) and GBRAM (Anton, 
1996), can be used to take into account security 
issues at design level.
All the above methodologies address the 
problem of how to state as clearly as possible the 
requirements that an information system must sat-
isfy in order to be considered secure (with respect 
to a set of given security policies). This is different 
from our goal, which is to define a conceptual 
model for representing privacy policies.
Kalloniatis & al. (2008) present a methodol-
ogy, called PRIS, to incorporate privacy require-
ments into the system design process. PRIS is a 
requirement engineering methodology focused on 
privacy issues rather than on security requirements 
although it can be applied to the latter as well. It is 
based on the Enterprise Knowledge Development 
(EKD) framework, which is a systematic approach 
for developing and documenting organisational 
knowledge.
PRIS considers privacy requirements as organi-
sational goals that need to be satisfied and adopts 
the use of privacy-process patterns as a way to: 
(1) analyse the impact of privacy requirement(s) 
on organisational goals, sub-goals and processes; 
and (2) facilitate the identification of the best 
system architecture supporting privacy-related 
business processes.
Thus, PRIS provides a complete view of the 
system including both the enterprise and privacy 
goals and refines the latter to identify a set of 
privacy requirements.
Instead, our approach introduces a set of 
concepts concerning privacy such as users, data, 
actions, and it defines the existent relationships 
among them, providing in this way a high level 
conceptual model, described in UML, that can be 
used to model privacy policies, which can be used 
to satisfy specific privacy requirements. In fact, in 
our approach, privacy requirements are addressed 
by introducing design patterns derived from the 
conceptual model. More specifically, our design 
patterns represent a set of design guidelines and 
schemes that can drive the designer towards the 
specification of a privacy aware system. In this 
way analysts and designers can describe privacy 
related features/requirements and then they can 
integrate them at design time in new or existing 
systems exploiting the visibility and usability of 
UML.
Agrawal & al. (2005) provide extensions to a 
RBDMS in order to express P3P privacy policies, at 
schema definition level. Furthermore, the authors 
define mechanisms for translating P3P privacy 
policies into a properly extended SQL-like data 
definition language. This is different from our 
approach, since what we propose is a conceptual 
model for the definition of privacy policies (not 
necessarily expressed in P3P) and for the speci-
fication of the needed functional modules of an 
application in order to enforce such policies.
Finally, in the field of SRE methodologies, 
several techniques have been proposed in order to 
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protect private data from unauthorized accesses. 
Typical examples are anonymizing techniques 
based on data suppression or randomization 
(Mielikinen, 2004; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 
2005). However, these techniques do not require 
the definition of any privacy policies; rather they 
can be used as building blocks for realizing them.
The literature also reports many works that 
propose patterns and design guidelines for ad-
dressing the requirements imposed by specific 
security and privacy problems.
Many security patterns were defined to address 
enterprise, architectural and user-level security 
(Yoder & al. 1997; Blakley & al. 2004; Chung & 
al., 2004; Steel & al., 2005; Schumacher & al., 
2006), while, presently, only few contributions 
concerning privacy have been defined. Chung & 
al. (2004) define privacy patterns for ubiquitous 
computing domain.
Schummer (2004) describes the privacy mas-
querade pattern, i.e., a pattern that specifies how it 
is possible to prevent personal information from 
being improperly transmitted.
Schumacher (2002) describes two privacy pat-
terns, named Pseudonymous Email and Protection 
against Cookies, respectively. The former specifies 
mechanisms for hiding the sender of an email mes-
sage; while the latter describes how to control the 
cookies in a web browser. Romanosky & al. (2006) 
introduce privacy patterns for online interactions, 
distinguishing between patterns for system archi-
tecture issues and patterns for end-user support. 
Hafiz (2006) defines anonymity design patterns for 
various types of online communication systems, 
online data sharing, location monitoring, voting 
and electronic cash management.
All the just mentioned patterns, however, ad-
dress specific application domain issues, while 
the solution that we propose in the following 
sections is more general and can be applied to 
different contexts.
Modelling PrivAcy
In order to model privacy policies it is necessary 
to introduce concepts such as users, data, actions 
and so on. The rest of the chapter adopts the ter-
minology introduced by the EU directive, which 
is summarized in what follows:
• personal data means any information re-
lating to an identified or identifiable natu-
ral person (referred to as data subject or 
subject).
• processing of personal data (processing) 
means any operation or set of operations 
which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such 
as collection, recording, organization, stor-
age, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, con-
sultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making avail-
able, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction;
• controller means the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or any other 
body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data;
• processor means a natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body 
which processes personal data on behalf of 
the controller;
• the data subject’s consent (consent) means 
any freely given specific and informed 
indication of his/her wishes by which the 
data subject signifies his/her agreement 
to personal data relating to him/her being 
processed.
Moreover, as a distinctive feature of a privacy 
policy, the processor is allowed to execute given 
processing actions only under explicit purposes 
and obligations. A purpose describes for what aims 
data are processed, and it can be defined either as 
a high-level activity (e.g., “marketing”, “customer 
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satisfaction”) or as a set of actions (e.g., “com-
pute the average price”, “evaluate the customer 
needs”). An obligation is a set of actions that the 
processor guarantees to perform, after the data 
have been processed, that is after the execution of 
processing actions. Controllers define processing 
actions, as well as purposes and obligations and 
are required to verify that the former are executed 
according to the latter.
Subjects, whenever their data are collected, 
must grant their consent before any processing 
can be done and must be informed of the purposes 
and of the obligations related to any processing. 
Notice that, the consent can be given selectively 
that is, a subject can grant the consent for one 
purpose, while denying it for another one.
Starting from the previously presented terms 
we introduce several concepts and refinement. 
More specifically, data handled by a system are 
categorized into different classes. Among them, 
one class includes sensitive data, that is data 
concerning the private life, political or religious 
creed, health conditions and so on. Another class 
contains identifiable data, that is, data describing 
the identity of individuals (e.g., first name, family 
name, address, telephone, etc.).
Finally, we define the concepts of role and 
function. The role (Ni & al., 2007) specifies 
whether an individual is a subject, a controller or 
a processor, while the function represents the task 
performed by an individual within an organization. 
Thus, role is a cross cutting concept that is do-
main independent, while function strictly depends 
on the application domain. For example, in the 
context of a hospital information system we may 
have different functions, such as doctor, nurse, 
head-nurse, employee, and so on. Notice that, a 
function implicitly defines the set of actions that 
can be executed by an individual. For instance, a 
doctor is allowed to prescribe therapies and ac-
cess patients’ case histories, while an employee 
is allowed to make an appointment for a medical 
examination.
Therefore, given an application scenario, each 
individual is characterized by a pair function-role, 
which specifies his/her behavioral profile with 
respect to a privacy policy.
the uMl Model
In the following we introduce a UML model that 
specifies the concepts occurring in a privacy 
policy along with their relationships. First of all 
we describe the static aspects of the model, by 
introducing all the structural elements involved 
by means of Class diagrams. Then, we describe 
by means of several Sequence diagrams the be-
havioral aspects of the model by specifying the 
basic interactions occurring among the previously 
introduced structural elements.
Figure 1 depicts a class diagram that provides 
a high level view of the basic structural elements 
of the model.
A privacy policy is represented by means of 
class PrivacyPolicy, which is composed of three 
different classes named User, Data and Action, 
respectively. Thus, an instance of PrivacyPolicy 
is characterized by specific instances of User, 
Data and Action.
Let us focus on the classes introduced by the 
diagram:
• User represents an actor either interested in 
processing data or involved by such a pro-
cessing. Users are characterized by func-
tions and roles. More specifically Function 
Figure 1. The privacy policy class diagram
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represents the employment of a user in an 
application domain, while Role charac-
terizes users with respect to privacy. As 
a consequence, Role is extended by three 
distinct classes to represent the different 
roles: Subject, which is anyone whose data 
are referred to, Processor, which is any-
one who asks for processing data by per-
forming some kind of action on them and 
Controller, which defines the allowed ac-
tions that can be performed by processors.
• Data represents the information referring 
to subjects that can be handled by pro-
cessors. Data is extended by means of 
Identifiable data and Sensitive data. The 
former represents the information that 
can be used to uniquely identify subjects, 
while the latter represents information that 
deserves particular care and that should not 
be freely accessible. Moreover, Data is a 
complex structure composed of basic in-
formation units named Field. Class Field 
contains the attributes name and content. 
The former represents an identifier used to 
identify the information contained in the 
field, while the latter describes the infor-
mation itself.
• Action represents any operation performed 
by User (usually Processor). Since in a 
privacy aware scenario a processing is ex-
ecuted under a purpose and an obligation, 
Action is defined as an abstract class that is 
extended by classes Obligation, Processing 
and Purpose. Moreover, Processing speci-
fies an aggregation relationship with 
Purpose and Obligation so that each ac-
tion can be recursively composed of other 
actions allowing the definition of complex 
actions in term of simpler ones. Finally, in-
stances of Action are created by instances 
of Controller by means of the services pro-
vided by class FactoryAction.
Figure 2 provides a complete view of the afore-
mentioned classes along with their relationships. 
For instance, the dependency relationship between 
Action and Data states that data are processed by 
actions, while the association between Subject and 
Data represents data ownership.
Notice that this model can be extended in 
order to support the definition of policies related 
to different application domains. For example, to 
specify privacy policies compliant with the Italian 
privacy legislation6, it is necessary to extend the 
model introducing the concept of “judicial data”. 
Such an extension can be easily obtained by in-
troducing a class Judicial that extends class Data.
Furthermore, several interfaces have been 
introduced to model the flow of information 
among the instances of the different classes. In 
fact, an interface defines the services that a class 
can either implement or use (invoke).
The interface ActionBehavior, provided by 
class Action, is introduced in order to model ac-
tion execution. ActionBehavior can be used by 
classes Processor and Controller that can invoke 
the method run() to represent the execution of an 
action. Notice that, each class extending Action 
inherits interface ActionBehavior and therefore 
may provide a specific implementation of method 
run().
The interface ConsentRequest, provided by 
class Subject, is used to notify subjects of both the 
purposes and the obligations of any processing of 
their data. Thus, an instance of class Controller, 
taken its id and an instance of Processing, invokes 
the method notify() of interface ConsentRequest to 
notify a given instance of Subject that a processing 
on his/her data may occur. Interface ConsentAc-
quisition, provided by class Controller, is used by 
class Subject to allow its instances to grant or deny 
the consent to data processing. More specifically, 
the interface provides the method setAgreement(), 
that taken an instance of Processing, the id of 
Subject and a boolean value, notifies the control-
ler whether the subject has granted or denied the 
consent to data processing.
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Finally, interface Control, defined by class 
Controller, is used by class Action to verify 
whether a given action can be executed, that is 
whether the subjects involved have granted the 
consent. Thus, interface Control provides the 
method verify() that, taken an instance of Action, 
returns whether the latter is authorized that is, the 
consent has been granted.
Notice that this model is meant to describe 
all the activities related to privacy even though 
some of them may occur outside the system. 
For example let us suppose that a new customer 
wants to open a checking account in a traditional 
bank. In this case he/she may interact with a bank 
employee who will provide the customer with all 
the information concerning the privacy policy. 
Before actually registering the new customer in 
the system, the employee asks him/her to sign a 
statement in which the customer grants the consent 
Figure 2. The class diagram that describes the conceptual model
Figure 3. The general scenario
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to data processing. Such an interaction is not sup-
ported by the system since it takes place by oral 
explanations and documents reading. However, 
from our point of view this corresponds to hav-
ing the employee invoking the method notify() of 
ConsentRequest and then the customer invoking 
the method setAgreement().
On the contrary, if we consider a new customer 
of an on-line bank the system will support all the 
interactions needed to get the informed consent. 
In both cases the way in which the interaction is 
modeled does not change, the difference being to 
which extent the activities are directly supported 
by the system rather than being specified by hu-
man executed procedures.
Although the class diagram of Figure 2 faith-
fully represents the components of privacy poli-
cies, it does not express any dynamic aspect. This 
can be done by means of UML Sequence diagrams 
and therefore in what follows we present some 
Sequence diagrams modeling general interaction 
schemes that are common to any privacy aware 
system. Notice that such diagrams can be special-
ized and extended for specific needs.
The sequence diagram of Figure 3 reports a 
general scenario that introduces the main actors 
along with the basic activities that can occur in 
a privacy aware system. The scenario refers to 
three different tasks, named ActionDefinition, 
ConsentAcquisition and ActionExecution, each 
of which is represented by means of a Sequence 
diagram. According to the semantics of UML 
Sequence diagram, such internal scenarios are 
sequentially executed.
The first task, named ActionDefinition, de-
scribes how it is possible to define new actions. 
Notice that actions can be exclusively defined by 
users characterized by the role of Controller, us-
ing the services provided by class FactoryAction.
Class FactoryAction provides several meth-
ods to allow controllers to create new actions. In 
particular the class allows the definition of the 
following basic actions:
• Data creation. The method defData(Data 
obj, String fieldName, String fieldType, 
String fieldId) returns a new basic ac-
tion whose execution creates an instance 
of class Field associated with obj. For 
instance defData(d1, “family name”, 
“String”, “001”), inserts a new data field 
named “family name” of type String into 
d1 (an instance of class Data).
• Data writing. The method defWrite(Field 
f, Byte[] content) returns an action whose 
execution updates the content of field f. 
For instance, the method defWrite() allows 
one to initialize the content of the previ-
ously created field, representing the family 
name, to the value “Smith”.
• Data reading. The method defRead(Field 
f) returns an action whose execution reads 
the content of the field f.
The definition of basic actions is described in 
the Sequence diagram, named BasicActionDefini-
tion, shown in Figure 4.
Such basic actions represent the behavioral 
unit for the definition of Processing, Obligation 
and Purpose. Once all the required basic actions 
are defined, the controller defines a new complex 
action by invoking the method defAction(…), 
provided by FactoryAction (seeFigure 5). The 
method defAction(…) takes as input the list of 
actions composing the new action along with its 
type (i.e., Purpose, Obligation or Processing). 
Notice that a Processing action is defined by 
composing instances of Purpose and Obligation, 
hence the purpose and the obligation associated 
with any instance of Processing can be easily 
retrieved.
Actions definition can be carried out by means 
of two different scenarios. The first one, shown 
in Figure 6, represents the most common sce-
nario in which, all the needed actions are pre-
defined by a controller.
In fact, for each application domain it is pos-
sible to identify a set of actions that almost every 
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processor will try to execute in order to carry out 
his/her duty. Such actions represent the services 
that the company provides to its customers (sub-
jects). In this case the subject consent is acquired 
a priori. As an example, let us consider the case 
of a potential bank customer that wants to open 
a checking account. The customer is informed 
that if he/she will request to make a domestic bank 
transfer, his/her data will be processed for the 
purpose of complying with his/her request under 
the obligation of notifying national authorities 
whenever the transferred amount exceeds a given 
threshold. Notice that in this scenario the cus-
tomer is informed and required to grant consent 
even if he/she will never request any bank trans-
fer to be made.
In the second scenario, shown in Figure 7, the 
action definition is triggered by a processor that 
needs to execute a not yet defined action. There-
fore, this scenario describes a situation in which 
specific actions are built in order to fulfill a specific 
request coming from a processor; in this case the 
subject is required to grant consent for any action 
for which the consent was not granted a priori. In 
this case, the processor interacts with the controller 
in order to define the purpose, the obligation and 
the needed processing. In particular, the processor 
sends his/her Id to the controller, which, in turn, 
instantiates three actions (a purpose, an obliga-
tion and a processing) requested for processing 
the data. Notice that Processing represents the 
intention to perform a specific data processing, 
which can be carried out only after the involved 
subject has granted the consent.
As an example, let us consider the case of an 
actual bank customer requesting to make an in-
Figure 4. The basic actions definition scenario
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ternational bank transfer. Since international bank 
transfers are less common than domestic ones, 
the customer was not informed nor he/she grant-
ed the consent when he/she opened the checking 
account. Therefore, when the customer requests 
the international bank transfer, he/she is informed 
that his/her data will be processed for the purpose 
of complying with his/her request under the ob-
ligation of notifying the National Security 
Agency. Notice that in this scenario the customer 
is informed and required to grant consent only 
when he/she requests for the first time to make 
an international bank transfer.
In both scenarios before action execution the 
Subject has been notified of the processing and, 
as described in Figure 8, he/she can grant or deny 
the consent.
Finally, the scenarios terminate with the ex-
ecution of the authorized actions (if any). As 
specified by the loop construct, depending on the 
processor needs, actions once authorized, can be 
executed multiple times.
Figure 5. The action definition scenario
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Figure 6. Action definition, the most typical scenario
Figure 7. Action definition, the alternative scenario
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towArds design solutions
Anonymity, informed consent acquisition and 
enforcement of privacy policies are fundamental 
requirements for privacy aware systems that can be 
used both to test the effectiveness of the model and 
to introduce design solutions based on extensions/
refinements of the model itself. In what follows we 
present three different design patterns providing a 
design solution for each of the above mentioned 
requirements. The same approach is used to 
provide solutions to other privacy requirements 
such as pseudonymity, unobservability and so on. 
Therefore, privacy requirements can be satisfied 
by providing appropriate design patterns providing 
the needed extensions to the conceptual model. 
Notice that such extensions should be viewed as 
being part of a development process in which one 
starts from a high level description and moves 
towards the solution by adding details concerning 
the different aspects of a privacy aware system.
Anonymity
Anonymity states that sensitive data managed by 
a system, cannot be used to retrieve the identity 
of the data owner, that is the subject to whom 
data refer, without an explicit authorization. For 
example, let us consider a hospital information 
system that stores both health related data (sensi-
tive data) and personal data of hospital patients. 
Hospital doctors may be allowed to access both 
kinds of data when they have to make a diagno-
sis, while if the hospital staff is conducting some 
statistics, the may be allowed to access only 
sensitive data without being able to retrieve the 
identity of patients.
The aim of this pattern is to introduce a do-
main independent solution schema that drives the 
construction of anonymity assurance mechanisms, 
which prevent the identification of individuals 
starting from their data.
Requirements
Several requirements must be taken into account 
when defining anonymity assurance mechanisms 
(Hafiz, 2006):
• Identity masking. Anonymity enabling 
mechanisms shall mask the identity of 
subjects.
Figure 8. The consent acquisition scenario
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• Usability. An anonymous data set shall 
be usable. Extreme solutions such as not 
releasing any data cannot be accepted. 
Moreover, anonymity enabling mecha-
nisms shall not alter the processing actions 
performed by a system.
• Performance. Anonymity enabling mecha-
nisms shall minimally alter the overall sys-
tem performances.
Solution
The proposed solution starts from the classification 
of data and users proposed in the conceptual model.
Data Structure
In order to define anonymity, the data handled 
by a system need to be suitably structured. Data 
are composed of fields that, depending on their 
characteristics, are grouped into sensitive and 
identifiable subsets. Moreover, a data type may be 
characterized by a hierarchical structure composed 
of other data types possibly classified as sensitive 
or identifiable.
In order to keep the link between identifiable 
and sensitive data, we introduce a reference field 
to the data structure used for identifiable data. 
This is done by means class RefField, which 
extends class Field of the conceptual model, as 
shown in Figure 9. The (inherited) attributes of 
Class RefField are used in the following way: the 
attribute name is set to the name of the data to 
which it refers, while the attribute content is set 
to the value of the attribute id of the instance of 
Data to which it refers.
For example, let us consider the definition of 
a data structure composed of the fields “family-
Name”, “city” and “disease”. Fields “family-
Name” and “city” identify the data owner, while 
“disease” represents a sensitive information. As 
a consequence two different data types are defined. 
The former, named “Person”, is composed of the 
identifiable fields, while the latter, named 
“Health”, contains the sensitive one. Let us con-
sider the following data sets: 1) “Smith”, “Milan”, 
“hemicranias”; 2) “Brown”, “New York”, “gastric 
ulcer”. Therefore, the first triplet is represented 
by an instance of class Identifiable in which the 
attribute name is set to “Person”, and the attribute 
id is set to “data001”, and by an instance of class 
Sensitive in which the attribute name is set to 
“Health” and attribute id is set to“data003”. 
Moreover, “data001” contains an instance of class 
Field characterized by the attribute name initial-
ized to “familyName”, the attribute id initialized 
to “field001”, and the attribute content set to 
“Smith”. It also contains a further Field character-
ized by the attribute name set to “city”, the at-
tribute id initialized to “field002”, and the attribute 
content set to “Milan”. Finally, “data003” contains 
an instance of Field characterized by the attribute 
name initialized to “Disease”, the attribute id 
initialized to “field005”, and the attribute content 
set to “hemicranias”. In order to represent the link 
between the identifiable data represented by 
“data001” and the sensitive data represented by 
“data003”, “data001” contains an instance of 
RefField in which the attribute name is set to 
“Health”, the attribute id is set to “ref001” and 
the attribute content is set to “data003”. Figure 
10 reports the structure of such data sets by means 
of a Composite Structure Diagram.
In order to prevent the identification of data 
owners starting from their sensitive data, in-
stances of Identifiable may own references to 
instances of Identifiable or Sensitive, while in-
stances of Sensitive can own only references to 
instances of Sensitive. In other words, instances 
of Sensitive cannot own any reference to in-
stances of Identifiable.
A second issue that must be taken into account 
concerns the possibility that starting from identifi-
able data one can access the associated sensitive 
data, by following the reference fields. However, 
the system should prevent non authorized users of 
the system to follow such references, that is there 
may be some users that can access identifiable data 
without being authorized to access sensitive data.
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The way in which we prevent non authorized 
accesses to sensitive data is based on cryptography. 
Notice that at this level we do not need to choose 
any particular encryption technique (e.g., public 
key, symmetric key, etc.), since the needed exten-
sions of the conceptual model are independent 
from encryption techniques.
Figure 9. Extensions of the conceptual model to support anonymity
Figure 10. The composite structure diagram that describes the example
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Handling Cryptography
The way in which we introduced cryptography is 
based on three new classes (see Figure 9): KeyDis-
tributionCenter, DataKey and FunctionRoleKey. 
The class KeyDistributionCenter manages the 
generation of the keys usable for encryption 
purposes. KeyDistributionCenter generates keys 
according to the restrictions imposed by the 
privacy policy. FunctionRoleKey represents the 
key associated with a specific pair Function-Role, 
while DataKey represents the key to encrypt the 
content of data fields.
In what follows we present the use of the pre-
viously introduced concepts for the definition of 
anonymity mechanisms.
Data Encryption
A key, named DataKey, is generated to encrypt 
the value of the attribute content of the reference 
fields that refer to instances of sensitive data. As 
an example, let us consider that for statistics pur-
poses we need to know how many people living 
in Milan suffer from hemicranias. As described 
above, such data types are separately defined 
and a reference field, named “Health”, is defined 
on “Person”. Notice that the attribute content of 
“Health” is encrypted, and therefore it is not pos-
sible to access the sensitive data without knowing 
the key that is required to decrypt such a field.
Actions
Data can be accessed only by means of actions 
(see Figure 2). Actions are expressly built to be 
executed by users that belong to a given function-
role pair. In order to guarantee that actions, once 
defined, can be executed only by authorized us-
ers, an authentication mechanism is introduced. 
More specifically, a key, represented by the class 
FunctionRoleKey, is generated and released to 
the authorized users.
FunctionRoleKey instances are handled by 
KeyDistributionCenter, which provides genera-
tion and secure communication mechanisms like 
the ones proposed by Kerberos7. Whenever a 
user-controller defines a new Action, two keys 
are generated. The former key is associated with 
the pair Function-Processor that is authorized 
to execute the action, while the latter with the 
pair Function-Controller that has to supervise 
the execution. Notice that the specification of 
the algorithm used for key generation, and of the 
communication protocol is out of the scope of 
this pattern.
In order to support encryption a new class 
and a new interface are introduced (see Figure 
11). The class, named AnonymityFactoryAction, 
extends class FactoryAction, while the interface, 
named AnonymityActionBehavior, extends the 
interface ActionBehavior. AnonymityFactoryAc-
tion redefines most of the methods inherited from 
FactoryAction (i.e., defRead(), defWrite() and 
defAction()) by adding a new parameter repre-
senting an instance of the encryption/decryption 
DataKey for defRead()/defWrite() and represent-
ing an instance of FunctionRoleKey that identifies 
the authorized users.
For example, let us suppose that a researcher 
who works in a health care institute wants to know 
how many people living in Milan suffer from 
hemicranias. Moreover, suppose that data are 
organized by means of the structure described in 
Figure 10. Therefore it is necessary to access the 
fields “city” and “disease”. The controller, in 
order to create such an action, invokes the meth-
od defAction() passing as parameter an instance 
of class FunctionRoleKey associated with the pair 
Researcher/Processor that is authorized to execute 
the action once defined.
Actions can be executed by invoking the 
method run() (defined by AnonymityActionBe-
havior), providing the key FunctionRoleKey, and 
the id of User. Notice that users authentication 
can be carried out in different ways. For example, 
the first task of method run() may check whether 
the function-role key provided by the user is the 
same key that was set at action definition time.
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Consequences
The pattern has the following benefits.
• Privacy. The separation of sensitive data 
from identifiable data, and the adoption of 
encryption techniques makes it more dif-
ficult to associate sensitive data with the 
identity of data owners.
• Minimal user involvement. The users 
are not required to modify their normal 
activities.
A not properly defined implementation of this 
pattern may suffer from the following weaknesses.
• Usability. A too high granularity level of 
encryption mechanisms can undermine the 
usefulness of data. As an example, in the 
case of database applications, if all the data 
entries are encrypted, the resultant dataset 
may be hardly used even by authorized 
users.
• Overhead and delay. The application of 
encryption mechanisms requires adequate 
computational resources. Hence, the over-
all system performances may worsen, and 
delays and/or overheads can be generated. 
In order to guarantee an adequate level of 
usability and privacy, it is necessary to bal-
ance the usage of encryption techniques.
informed consent
Informed consent states that individuals (i.e., data 
owners) must be informed on the purposes of any 
processing involving their data. Therefore, the 
goal of this pattern is to provide a basic schema to 
deal with the acquisition of the informed consent.
Requirements
Several requirements need to be taken into account 
in order to define informed consent acquisition 
mechanisms:
• Disclosure. The data owner has to be in-
formed of the processing purposes, before 
processing can take place.
• Agreement. The data owner has to reply to 
the requests to access his/her data by speci-
fying whether he/she agrees upon.
• Comprehension. The data owner has to 
state whether he/she understood how the 
requested information will be used.
• Voluntariness. The data owner has to en-
sure whether his/her consent is given with-
out any coercion or external influence.
Figure 11. Extensions of the conceptual model to support anonymity
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• Competence. The data owner has to de-
clare whether he/she is adequately compe-
tent to provide the consent. For example, 
he/she has to state to be of age.
Solution
According to the conceptual model presented in 
this chapter, data owners are represented by means 
of class Subject, while actions are represented by 
means of classes Processing, Purpose, and Ob-
ligation. Moreover, all the actions involving the 
acquisition of the informed consent are executed 
by an instance of class Controller. Therefore, 
the acquisition of the informed consent requires 
user-subjects and user-controllers to communicate 
among them using the method of the interface 
ConsentAcquisition provided by class Controller. 
However, in order to deal with the requirements 
of competence, voluntariness and comprehension 
it is necessary to extend the interface Consen-
tAcquisition introducing a new interface, named 
InformedConsentAcquisition (see Figure 12).
Such an extension satisfies all the previously 
introduced requirements, as discussed in what 
follows:
• Disclosure. In order to inform User-Subject 
of the processing purpose, User-Controller 
invokes the method notify() of the interface 
ConsentRequest by specifying the purpose 
of the processing and under which obliga-
tion the action will be executed.
• Agreement. In order to reply to the request 
of User-Controller, User-Subject invokes 
the method setAgreement() by specifying 
whether he/she granted the consent for 
processing his/her data.
• Comprehension. The User-Subject, in or-
der to confirm whether he/she understood 
how the requested information will be used, 
invokes the method setComprehension().
• Voluntariness. The User-Subject, in order 
to ensure whether his/her consent is given 
without any coercion or external influence, 
invokes the method setVoluntariness().
• Competence. The User-Subject, in order to 
declare whether he/she is adequately com-
petent to provide the consent, invokes the 
method setCompetence().
The UML Sequence diagram of Figure 13 
describes a consent acquisition scenario. Notice 
that the sequence of actions proposed is only one 
of the many scenarios that can be defined. In other 
words, Subject has to invoke all the methods of 
the interface InformedConsentAcquisition. In 
case Subject does not grant his/her consent, all 
the actions that were defined for accessing his/
her data are destroyed.
Consequences
This pattern offers the following benefits:
• Trust: the exchange of clear and complete 
information increases the individuals con-
fidence in the system.
• Protocol: the proposed pattern, besides de-
fining the fundamental interactions among 
the actors involved in a consent acquisition 
scenario, supports the definition of differ-
ent interaction protocols.
Figure 12. The extensions required to support the 
acquisition of the informed consent
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Figure 13. The consent acquisition scenario
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This pattern may suffer from the following 
weaknesses:
• The pattern can not assure that the sys-
tem will comply with the obligations un-
der which the consent is given. Notice 
that this is a requirement for the pattern 
Enforcement.
• The declarations of comprehension, vol-
untariness and competence depend on the 
user. Since human behavior is unpredict-
able, the declarations may not reflect the 
truth and they cannot be directly verified.
• The exchange of messages may worsen the 
overall system performance: delays and/or 
overheads may be generated.
Enforcement
Privacy aware systems prevent the unregulated 
disclosure of data by means of access control 
mechanisms. Although such mechanisms regulate 
data access they cannot assure that the processing 
activities comply with the stated purposes, nor 
with the stated obligations that were given to a 
Subject at consent acquisition time.
This privacy pattern tries to address such is-
sues, focusing on the definition of enforcement 
mechanisms that aim at verifying the compliance 
of the processing activities with the privacy policy.
Requirements
Once a data owner granted the explicit consent 
the system has to guarantee that processing is 
compliant with the stated purposes. Thus, it is 
necessary to provide a way to verify processing 
compliance. In principle there are two different 
ways in which such a verification can be carried 
out: run-time verification and ex-post verification. 
Run-time verification requires that every action 
is checked before actual execution, while ex-post 
verification requires that actions are verified once 
they are executed (e.g., audit-based mechanisms). 
Thus, the former aims at preventing the execution 
of actions that are not authorized, while the latter 
aims at analyzing the system evolution in order to 
find any possible unauthorized processing.
Solution
All the actions required by a privacy policy are 
defined as instances of classes Purpose, Obliga-
tion and Processing, which are extensions of the 
abstract class Action. Class Action uses interface 
Control that, in turn, defines the method verify() 
to carry out the verification of the compliance of 
any instance of Action with a given policy.
Actions are executed by Processor by invok-
ing the method run() of the abstract class Action, 
while verification is carried out by Controller.
In what follows we discuss both run-time and 
ex-post verification.
Run-Time Scenario
A Processor, in order to execute an action in-
vokes the method run() that, in turn, invokes the 
method verify() thus allowing Controller to check 
whether the action is compliant with the privacy 
policy. If not, Controller prevents Processor from 
executing any further action, as described in the 
ActionExecution scenario reported in Figure 14. 
Notice that the enforcement mechanism cannot 
oblige Processor to perform the required obliga-
tions, if any.
Ex-Post Scenario
In an ex-post enforcement scenario, the verifica-
tion of the compliance of the actions executed by 
Processor is performed after their actual execution.
Verification is carried out as in the run-time 
scenario, that is Controller invokes the method 
verify(). However, in this case Controller cannot 
prevent Processor from executing unauthorized 
actions, but the non compliance can be recorded 
so that Processor can be prevented from execut-
ing other actions.
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Figure 14. Enabling run-time enforcement
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Consequences
This pattern offers the following benefits:
• Generality. This solution is general enough 
to be applied to different application 
domains.
• Performance. Ex-post verification does not 
affect the overall system performances, 
while run-time verification may worsen 
the performances of the actions that need 
to be verified.
• Preserving privacy: Run-time verification 
prevents privacy violations to occur, while 
ex-post verification may result in privacy 
violations that will not be discovered until 
verification takes place.
This pattern suffers from the following weak-
nesses:
• Independence. This pattern does not ad-
dress the definition of the activities per-
formed by the verify() method. Such activi-
ties strictly depend on the characteristics of 
the system and of the actions to be verified.
• Overhead and delay. Run-time verification 
requires adequate computational resourc-
es. As a consequence, the overall system 
performances may worsen.
An exAMPle
In order to assess the model presented in this 
chapter, we discuss an example of its application 
in the field of healthcare.
Hospital Information Systems are a fundamen-
tal tool for healthcare organizations since they 
support the management of the most important 
and characterizing internal processes of a hospital 
structure. Such systems provide different types of 
services such as: patient registrations, physical 
examination reservations, patients’ admission, etc. 
All these services handle sensitive and personal 
data of the patients and of the personnel that op-
erate in the hospital structure, hence a particular 
care to the management of such data is required.
The rest of this section provides a simple ex-
ample concerning the definition of a privacy policy 
for data management in a Hospital Information 
System of a diagnostic centre.
A diagnostic centre is an organization where 
different actors operate. The following functions 
are considered in our scenario: doctor, nurse, 
employee, laboratory technician and outpatient.
• Outpatients need to be medically assisted. 
They request a physical examination with 
a medical specialist or a diagnostic test, 
and once examined they pay the fee
• Doctors examine outpatients, access and 
modify their case histories, prescribe ther-
apies or other medical examinations.
• Nurses execute specific actions such as tak-
ing a sample of blood, or specific physical 
examination such as measuring the blood 
pressure.
• Employees perform bureaucratic activities: 
such as registering outpatients, making ap-
pointments for medical examinations, pre-
paring purchase orders.
• Laboratory technicians are specialized per-
sonnel that execute diagnostic tests and 
draw up the medical report.
the Privacy Policy
Data processing has to be regulated by policies 
that specify 1) who is allowed to process data, and 
2) what can be done with such data. The system 
manages different types of data:
• Patient case histories, which are detailed 
records on the background of a person un-
der treatment.
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• Medical examination prescriptions: the re-
quests of thorough diagnostic tests.
• Medical examination results: the results of 
the diagnostic tests.
• Identifiable data: identifiable data associ-
ated with patients
• Administrative data: the payment state for 
medical examinations and treatments.
In what follows we consider one of the activi-
ties that are usually supported by a HIS, namely 
blood tests management.
Let us consider that an outpatient needs to 
contact the diagnostic center to request an ap-
pointment for a blood test.
The following scenario sketches the involved 
actors and actions:
• An employee makes the appointment for 
the medical examination;
• The outpatient goes to the appointment, 
and a nurse takes a sample of his/her blood;
• The outpatient pays the fee at the payment 
office;
• A laboratory technician executes the blood 
test and stores the results of the patient in 
the system;
• The patient picks up the results.
The privacy policy that we wants to model 
must satisfy the following requirements:
• Outpatients must be informed of the pro-
cessing purposes of the diagnostic centre.
• The processing of the data of the outpa-
tients is exclusively allowed under their 
explicit consent.
• The system has to prevent the identification 
of outpatients starting from their health re-
lated data.
• The processing actions can be exclusively 
executed by authorized users
Modeling the example
The actors involved in the proposed scenario are 
represented by means of instances of the classes 
User, Function and Role. Notice that in a real 
scenario users may be characterized by multiple 
function-role associations, but in this example 
we do not consider this situation for the sake of 
simplicity.
Employees are instances of User characterized 
by a Function that specify the task of “Employee” 
and by the role Processor, since employees process 
the data of the patients. Similarly, doctors are char-
acterized by the Function “Doctor” and the role 
of Processor, while technicians are characterized 
by the Function “Laboratory Technician” and the 
role of Processor. Finally, outpatients are the data 
owners whose data will be processed by doctors, 
laboratory technicians and employees. Therefore, 
outpatients are characterized by the role of Subject 
and no Function is associated with them.
Data
The data managed by the system concern out-
patients, appointments, costs, payments and the 
results of diagnostic tests. Moreover, the system 
should keep track of which laboratory technician 
executes a diagnostic test for a given outpatient.
First of all it is necessary to model the data 
structure and to classify the different Data in-
stances as sensitive or identifiable. In particular 
the following data types (i.e. instances of class 
Data) are introduced:
• “Person”: composed of fields such as “first 
name”, “family name”, “birth date”, “ad-
dress”, “telephone number”, “social secu-
rity number”, which identify an outpatient.
• “Physical examination”, “Diagnostic test”: 
composed of fields such as: “date”, “time”, 
“place”, “examination type”, “examination 
description”, which provide information 
on the examination/test.
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• “Price list”: composed of fields such as 
“examination type” and “price”, which 
describe the price associated with each 
examination.
• “Result”: composed of fields that describe 
the results of the examination / test.
• “Processor trace”: composed of fields that 
keep track of the users that performed the 
examination / test.
• “Payment information”: composed of 
fields that keep track of the payment of the 
examinations/tests.
“Person” is an identifiable data type that stores 
references to instances of sensitive data such 
as “Diagnostic test” / “Physical examination”. 
Moreover, “Physical examination”/ “Diagnostic 
test” stores a reference to further sensitive data 
named “Result”, “Processor trace” and “Payment 
information”. “Price list” is neither sensitive not 
identifiable data type.
Actions
In what follows we introduce the actions needed 
to model blood tests management.
• “Registration”: registers a new outpatient 
into the information system of the diagnos-
tic centre
• “Physical examination reservation” / 
“Diagnostic test reservation”: makes a res-
ervation for an examination / diagnostic 
test
• “Log Processor”: keeps track of the pro-
cessor that executes specific actions
• “Record Result”: stores the tests result of 
the outpatient
• “Pay the bill”: stores the payment of 
the fee associated with a test or with an 
examination
• “Check payment”: verifies that a fee was 
paid
• “Print result”: prints out the results of an 
examination
In order to assure anonymity we assume that 
actions are executed only by authorized users. 
Moreover, we assume that a key distribution 
centre and a key management service exist so that 
encryption keys can be created and distributed to 
each pair function-role that operates the system. In 
particular, the keys are used to encrypt/decrypt the 
reference fields needed to access sensitive data. 
The choice of a specific encryption/decryption 
algorithm is not discussed being out of the scope 
of this chapter.
For each action it is necessary to specify: 1) the 
data types and the fields that need to be accessed; 2) 
the keys that are needed to access reference fields; 
and 3) which pair Function-Role can execute the 
action along with the needed keys.
Scenarios
In the following we introduce several scenarios, 
each of which describes the way in which the 
interactions between the different actors and the 
system occur. In particular, the scenarios taken 
into account concern:
• The acquisition of the informed consent 
from the outpatient.
• The registration of the outpatient.
• The way in which appointment for blood 
tests are made.
• The way in which the blood sample is tak-
en from the outpatient.
• How the outpatient pays the fee.
• The activities related to the blood test 
examination.
Acquiring the Consent
Before any processing concerning the outpatient 
data can take place, he/she has to grant the informed 
consent. Therefore an explanation of the process-
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ing purposes must be provided to outpatients. 
Notice that this scenario follows the Informed 
Consent Pattern.
Whenever a new outpatient enters the diag-
nostic centre, an employee at the registration desk 
asks the patient to provide the consent to process 
his/her data. Thus the employee acts as Processor, 
while the outpatient acts as Subject.
The employee informs the patient by means 
of the method notify() provided by interface 
ConsentRequest. Once done, the outpatient is 
informed of the actions (processing, purpose and 
obligations) that the system of the diagnostic center 
may execute on his/her data.
Then, the outpatient interacts with the infor-
mation system by specifying his/her comprehen-
sion, competence, voluntariness and agreement 
by means of the methods setComprehension(), 
setCompetence(), setVoluntariness() and setAgree-
ment() provided by interface InformedConsentAc-
quisition. Since no action can be executed on the 
data of an outpatient if he/she does not grant the 
consent, the following scenarios can take place 
only if the consent was granted.
Registering the Outpatient
The employee records the data of the outpatient 
by means of the method run() of the action 
“Registration”. In order to execute the method 
run() the employee has to specify his/her id and 
his/her FunctionRoleKey. In order to verify that 
the employee is authorized to execute the action, 
the method run() checks whether the provided 
FunctionRoleKey equals the one introduced at 
action definition time. If the key is the same the 
action is executed and the data of the outpatient 
are stored in the system, that is a new instance of 
“Person” is created, its attribute id is initialized 
and the value is communicated to the outpatient. 
Otherwise the execution is aborted since the 
employee is not authorized to execute the action.
Notice that this check can be considered as 
a run-time enforcement in which the role of the 
controller is played by the system rather than by 
a physical person.
Making the Appointment
Once the outpatient is registered, the employee 
can make an appointment for the blood test by 
executing the action “Diagnostic test reservation”. 
This action is composed of multiple basic actions 
(data writing/data reading) involving some of the 
fields of “Person”, “Price list” and “Diagnostic 
test”. More specifically, the action requires to ac-
cess the fields “first name”, “family name”, “birth 
date” and “social security number” of “Person” 
and the fields “examination type” and “price” of 
“Price list”.
The action defines a new instance of “Diagnos-
tic test” and initializes the fields “date”, “time”, 
“place”, “examination type” and “examination 
description”. The action requires the employee 
to provide his/her function-role-key, so that the 
keys required to access the reference fields of the 
involved data sets (“Diagnostic test” of “Person”, 
and “Payment information”, “Result” and “Proces-
sor trace” of “Diagnostic test”) can be automati-
cally retrieved from the key distribution centre. 
Therefore the action is executed by means of the 
method run() by specifying the identifier of the 
employee, his/her FunctionRoleKey, the identifier 
of the outpatient, the type and a description of the 
diagnostic test, the date, the time and the place 
of the examination. As in the previous scenario, 
the system checks whether the employee is al-
lowed to execute the action. The action creates 
a new instance of “Diagnostic test”, whose id, 
once encrypted using the key associated with 
the sensitive data “Diagnostic test”, is stored in 
the homonymous reference of the instance of 
“Person” representing the outpatient. The action 
also creates an instance of “Payment informa-
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tion”, “Result”, and “Processor trace”. “Payment 
information” specifies the total amount due for 
the examination, while “Result” will be used by 
the laboratory technician to store the results of 
the examination. Finally, “Processor trace” is 
used to keep track of the examination executors. 
Notice that this action initializes only the field id 
of “Result” and “Processor trace”, and the fields 
id and total of “Payment information” while all 
the other fields will be set during the execution 
of other actions.
The values of id are encrypted with the keys 
associated with sensitive data “Payment informa-
tion”, “Result” and “Processor trace”, respectively, 
and the resulting values are stored in the homony-
mous reference fields of “Diagnostic test”.
When the execution completes, the diagnostic 
test is booked.
Taking a Sample of Blood
The outpatient gives the id of the reservation to 
the nurse in charge of taking the blood sample. 
Once the blood sample is taken the nurse labels 
the test tube with the id of the test (i.e., the value 
of the attribute id of “Diagnostic test”). Then 
he/she registers the test by invoking the action 
“Log Processor”, which creates an instance of 
“Processor trace” and initializes the value of the 
field “executor” with the id of the nurse.
Notice that also in this scenario the system 
checks whether the action is executed by an 
authorized member of the staff (i.e., the nurse). 
As usual this is done by means of the key associ-
ated with the pair Nurse-Processor that has to be 
provided when executing the action.
Paying the Fee
The outpatient has to pay the fee for the execution 
of diagnostic test. Hence, he/she provides the id 
of the reservation to the payment office employee 
that, in turn, registers the payment by invoking 
the action “Pay the bill”. This action accesses 
the field “examination type” of “Diagnostic test” 
and the fields “examination type” and “price” of 
“Price list”. The value of the field “examination 
type” of “Diagnostic test” is used to calculate 
the price associated with the examination. The 
resulting value is used to update the field “paid” 
of “Payment information”.
Examining the Sample
The laboratory technician executes the diagnostic 
test on the sample of blood. Once done, he/she 
executes the action “Log Processor” to keep trace 
of the technician who did the test. The action uses 
the id written on the label of the test tube and the id 
of the technician. Finally, the technician stores the 
results of the test by executing the action “Record 
test results”, which sets the values of all the fields 
of the data type “Result”.
At this point the outpatient may get the results 
by providing the id of the “Diagnostic test” to 
the employee. The employee checks whether the 
outpatient paid the fee by means of the action 
“Check payment”. During action execution the 
key to decrypt the field “Payment information” 
of “Diagnostic test” is retrieved. Once decrypted, 
the value is used to verify whether the outpatient 
has paid the amount due. If this is the case, the 
employee invokes the action “Print Results”, oth-
erwise he/she notifies the outpatient that he/she 
still owes some money to the diagnostic centre.
Action “Print Results” decrypts the reference 
field “Result” of “Diagnostic test” to access the 
instance of “Result” so that the complete report 
can be printed and handed to the outpatient.
conclusion
Privacy is becoming more and more important in 
many aspects of every day life, and therefore it is 
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becoming a fundamental requirement in the devel-
opment of systems that handle individuals data.
In this chapter we presented an UML-based 
conceptual model for the definition of general pri-
vacy policies, allowing one to define the concepts 
needed to deal with privacy-related information. 
The choice of using UML is motivated by the fact 
that it is well known by a wide range of analysts, 
modelers and programmers and therefore the 
model can be easily understood. Moreover, UML 
supports a model centric development process 
and thus the different diagrams introduced in 
this chapter provide different views showing the 
main aspects of the whole model. Finally, UML 
can be used for representing concepts at different 
levels of abstraction. Even though the presented 
model has a high level of abstraction, it can be 
easily extended and adapted for specific applica-
tion domains;
This chapter also describes some design 
solutions for specific privacy related recurrent 
problems. More specifically, the chapter pres-
ents a general solution to implement anonymity, 
to support the informed consent and to define 
enforcement mechanisms.
The model provides the conceptual founda-
tions that are required by such problems, such 
as the separation of sensitive from identifiable 
data, and the classification of roles and actions. 
The proposed solutions, represented by means of 
design patterns, consist in concepts and guidelines 
that drive the modeler towards the definition of 
privacy aware systems. The solutions extend the 
conceptual model by adding the elements, such 
as data encryption, needed to support the above 
mentioned requirements.
An example concerning the healthcare domain 
presents the application of the patterns. The ex-
ample drives the reader through the classification 
of users and actions, and shows how it is possible 
to integrate the encryption mechanisms in order 
to define anonymity and how it is possible to sup-
port the informed consent and the enforcement.
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